Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for La Rochefoucauld, Xenophanes and Michael Williams

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48 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
7914 To try to be wise all on one's own is folly [Rochefoucauld]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
3593 The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
3585 Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M]
3584 Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
3599 Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
3591 We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
3582 Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
3592 Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
3579 Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
3581 Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
3564 Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8851 Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
3595 What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
8849 Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
8853 Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M]
3580 Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
3578 Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M]
8855 Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
3576 Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M]
3577 Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
3589 Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M]
3590 Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
3571 Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M]
3574 Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
3586 Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M]
3567 How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M]
3569 In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
3573 Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
3565 Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
3566 We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
8852 In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
411 If we succeed in speaking the truth, we cannot know we have done it [Xenophanes]
3594 Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
3575 Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
412 If God had not created honey, men would say figs are sweeter [Xenophanes]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
3587 Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
7118 La Rochefoucauld's idea of disguised self-love implies an unconscious mind [Rochefoucauld, by Sartre]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
3588 Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
7912 Judging by effects, love looks more like hatred than friendship [Rochefoucauld]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
7915 Supreme cleverness is knowledge of the real value of things [Rochefoucauld]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
7917 Realising our future misery is a kind of happiness [Rochefoucauld]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
7913 Virtue doesn't go far without the support of vanity [Rochefoucauld]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
7916 True friendship is even rarer than true love [Rochefoucauld]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
9299 We are bored by people to whom we ourselves are boring [Rochefoucauld]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
1640 The basic Eleatic belief was that all things are one [Xenophanes, by Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
3055 Xenophanes said the essence of God was spherical and utterly inhuman [Xenophanes, by Diog. Laertius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
407 Mortals believe gods are born, and have voices and clothes just like mortals [Xenophanes]
408 Ethiopian gods have black hair, and Thracian gods have red hair [Xenophanes]